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ABSTRACT
The authors develop a political economy framework to study the post- September 11th
environmental changes and firm responses in the owner/operator sector of the U.S.
motorcoach industry. Based on a comprehensive analysis of both evolutionary and
revolutionary changes in the competitive and regulatory environments faced by the firms
in this industry, their policy and strategic responses to the terrorist acts of September 11,
2001, on U.S. soil are examined. The industry’s response is captured (i.e., collective action
response) by surveying 163 firms operating and competing in the owner/operator sector of
the U.S. motorcoach industry. Several descriptive statistics are synthesized and analyzed
for a structured presentation of the survey findings. In conclusion, contributions and
limitations of this study, as well as directions for future research, are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. transportation sectors adapted promptly
to the challenges engendered by the terror
attacks on U.S. soil September 11, 2001.
Though initially grounded at U.S. borders,
motor carriers responded effectively to
requests for expedited shipments. Rail faced
some slowdowns, but recovered quickly
enough for Norfolk Southern to contribute
1,000 rail cars to transport debris free of
charge in the World Trade Center cleanup
(Morton, Hyland, Aichlmayr, and Freeze
2001). The U.S. air cargo carriers suffered
heavy losses when the Federal Aviation
Association banned air travel for two days
following the attacks on Washington D.C.,
and New York City (Freeze 2001), but was
back to full speed by week’s end. Though
these short term coordinated efforts returned
the nation’s transportation and logistics
networks to normal and this operational
recovery provided some sense of security,
much less is known about specific policy and
strategic responses to terrorism-induced
environmental change faced by specific
sectors of the transportation network.
The purpose of this research is to identify the
emerging patterns of policy changes to
episodic events of terror and systemic
strategic responses in emergency prepared
ness of the owner/operator sector of the
motorcoach industry in light of the attacks
and subsequent war. The vehicle to explain
such reaction is the political economy
framework (see Stern and Reve 1980, and
Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983).
This transportation sector’s response
patterns are analyzed by looking at the
actions and intentions of the firms operating
and competing in the U.S. motorcoach
industry in the months following the terror
attacks on New York City and Washington
D.C. The focus on the owner/operator sector
48
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of the motorcoach industry as the backdrop is
due to this sector’s functioning at the
boundary of transportation and travel/
tourism industries, as both of these
industries have been hit hard by terror
(Pizam and Fleicher 2002). Before discussing
the results of the research, a review of the
state of the U.S. motorcoach industry is
presented.

THE U.S. MOTORCOACH INDUSTRY:
FOCUS ON ITS OWNER/OPERATOR
SECTOR
The charter and tour portion of the motor
coach business tend to be family-owned,
requiring long hours with much of the
charter work occurring on weekends. It
involves enormous capital expenditures offset
by historical 15-20% profit margins. During
the late 1990’s many changes occurred which
had tremendously negative effects on the
industry. Consolidation was a leading threat
to many independents. Revenue was flat,
new equipment costs were escalating and
overcapacity in the market was becoming
commonplace. Marketing was a virtually
unknown concept with owners adopting an
order-taking approach rather than marketing
their business.
Low entry barriers
encouraged small, inexperienced players to
join. Lending companies encouraged new
entrants and rapid growth with
comparatively easy financing terms resulting
in increased sales of new equipment. Motor
coach companies were viewed by many
customers as undifferentiated, with price as
the major distinguishing factor. Therefore,
when the new entrants finally realized the
total operating costs, these companies could
not afford the payments and repossessions
became commonplace.
The motorcoach industry is comprised of
three major business segments: charter,
linehaul, and tour. The largest segment,

charter work, which represents hauling
persons from point to point, comprises 72% of
the business, yet represents the lowest
margin. Line haul (e.g., designated routes
from city to city or to airport terminals)
represents 18% of all motorcoach business
and tour groups comprise 10% of the
motorcoach business. During the late 1990’s
tour groups represented 14% of the business
in the industry and line hauls were 15% of
the business. The demand for motorcoach
tours has fallen while the demand for line
hauls has risen, yet few owner/operators are
involved in line haul business. Almost 96%
of the motorcoach companies are involved in
charter operations (i.e., the hiring of a
motorcoach for a specific group) and only 12%
of the companies are involved in line hauls.
Those companies operating routes utilize
approximately 8,000 to 10,000 motorcoaches
and account for 50 percent of all motorcoach
mileage (UMA, 2001).
The motorcoach provision market is made up
of two core groups: independents and
consolidators.
While the independents
represent small and mid-size companies and
a handful of large companies, the recent
trend toward consolidation has emphasized
the negative state that the industry faces.
Consolidation by the three largest players
(CoachUSA, Laidlaw and VEC Tours) was at
first envisioned to develop economies of scale
due to vastness in size and characterized by
centralized management and operating
efficiencies. However, the resulting overall
financial performance has not been superior
to the independent operators and regionally
managed consolidators have not best served
the interests of customers in developing on
going relationships.
In a 2000 Survey conducted by R. L. Banks &
Associates, the motorcoach industry was
estimated to be comprised of roughly 4,000
firms and about 10 percent of those are based

in Canada (Schulz 2001). These companies
operate approximately 44,000 buses. The
companies in the industry range from very
small (those companies with less than five
coaches) to the largest consolidator that has
almost 3700 coaches. About ninety percent of
the industry is comprised of small businesses
operating fewer than 25 coaches. These
companies run about 19,000 buses or slightly
more than two-fifths (40 percent) of the total
fleet and account for almost two-fifths of the
total industry mileage. It is estimated that
almost 2000 companies operate with fewer
than 5 coaches and 65% of the companies are
operating with fewer than 10 buses (ABA,
2000). Yet, the industry provides jobs for
almost 200,000 workers and generates
approximately $7.4 billion in business.
The mid-sized segment is comprised of
approximately 320 firms that operate
between 25 and 99 buses each. These
companies run about 14,000 buses or almost
one-third (31 percent) of the fleet and
account for about one-third of the industry
mileage (ABA, 2000).
The large segment in the industry is
comprised of 50 firms that operate 100 or
more buses (UMA, 2001). The top 50 firms
had total buses in 2001 of 19,047 but the
total had fallen to 14,007 by the beginning of
2002 (Starcic, 2002). The largest companies
operate about 11,000 buses or about onefourth (25%) of the fleet and drive 30 percent
of the total industry mileage (ABA, 2000).
Each motorcoach carries over 20,000
passengers per year on average, although
there are wide variations between firms, with
larger operations and scheduled service
companies reporting higher average
ridership. Larger carriers, those operating
100 or more buses, carry an average of
26,000 passengers per bus annually. The
mid-size companies range between 9,000 to
Spring 2003
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18,000 passengers per bus.
Smaller
companies with fewer than 24 buses carry
about 9,000 passengers per bus annually
(ABA, 2000).
A fully loaded motorcoach (i.e., 46 passengers
on average) on a charter or tour making an
overnight stay contributes an average of
$5,000 to $7,500 per day to the local economy
in expenditures including meals, lodging,
shopping, admission fees, souvenirs and local
taxes (ABA, 2000). The 1996 direct economic
impact of the group tour business in North
America was more than $11.6 billion. In
Washington, D. C. alone, 23.4 percent of 21
million annual visitors arrive by motorcoach.
If only half of those visitors came as part of
an overnight tour, $424 million flows into
those local businesses (George Washington
University, 2001).
Three consolidators are key players in the
industry. Coach USA has 3,685 motorcoaches and is comprised of 188 companies
representing 10% of the industry. Laidlaw
Greyhound owns 2775 motorcoaches and is
predominantly a line haul company with less
that 1% of their business generated by tours
and charters. VEC Tours has 870 motorcoaches and represents 1% of the business
with 16 companies (Starcic, 2002). In U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts, VEC filed for Chapter
Eleven bankruptcy protection from creditors
as business plummeted as a result of the
terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Though
motorcoach carriage represents a mere 2% of
overall passenger transport in the U.S.,
motorcoach carriers transport more
passengers in two weeks than Amtrak
transports in an entire year. Thus, how this
industry responds to terror may offer insight
into other transport sectors and to business
in general.
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THE STUDY
For the development of the analytical
framework to guide the study, it was
important to distinguish between two
emerging constructs in the extant literature,
emergency preparedness and homeland
security. Emergency preparedness is related
to the proactive groundwork laid by firms in
their contingency preparation for potential
acts of terrorism. On the one hand, terrorism
by its very nature is episodic. On the other
hand, homeland security is systemic. That
is, homeland security is the operating
foundation/force of a firm’s emergency pre
paredness policy. In other words, it is not a
matter of choice, but rather it has to be
considered an imperative in light of the
episodes of terror or threats of terror. As a
result, it has become an integral part of a
firm’s decision making context for risk
management.
Following the foundational work by Stern
and Reve (1980) and Achrol, Reve, and Stern
(1983), the model for empirical examination
of industry-wide response to terror in the
motorcoach industry is a political economy
framework. The political economy frame
work adapted for the post-9/11 motorcoach
industry environment is capsulated in Figure
1. As indicated, there are two primary
driving forces: (1) evolutionary changes in the
competitive environment (e.g., consolidation
and restructuring processes), and (2)
revolutionary changes in the regulatory
environment (e.g., homeland security,
policies, and practices after September 11th).
Both drivers have mutually interacting
economy components and a polity. These
forces then influence the operating environ
ments of the firms competing in the
motorcoach industry, eliciting their policy

responses (e.g., emergency preparedness) and
strategic responses (e.g., acquisitions and
restructuring intentions).
Grounded in the model of a political
economy-adapted framework of post-9/11
environmental change in the motorcoach
industry (See Figure 1), the study seeks to
make a significant contribution to emerging
arena of research examining how homeland
security changes are mapped onto emergency
preparedness as a firm’s proactive approach
to the threat of episodic terror events, often
mandated through regulatory intervention.

An additional unique contribution of this
research is the unit of analysis.
The
members fo the sample frame are owner/
operators. Owner/operators have received
very little attention in transportation and
tourism travel research, as the most common
sampling is done at the customer or
passenger level. In our study, we queried
owner/operators in order to assess firm-level
responses and intentions in a post-9/11
marketplace.

FIGURE 1
POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK OF POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE IN THE MOTORCOACH INDUSTRY
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Note, in Figure 1, the role of government
(i.e., federal, state, local) has been omitted
from the equation (i.e., model) of environ
mental change in the motorcoach industry.
In contrast to the bailing out of the airline
industry by federal mandates, the motorcoach industry was forced to absorb the cost
of change. In general, it is crucial to define
the concepts, related issues, policies, and
practices of homeland security and emer
gency preparedness at governmental, firm,
and emerging industry levels in order to
explain how the interaction between changes
in regulatory and competitive environments
influence the outcomes and interactions of
motorcoach firms’ plicy and strategic
responses.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Owner/operators of motorcoach firms in the
U.S. were chosen as key informants in order
to capture the most robust data available.
Respondents filled out a detailed question
naire at one of two national conventions in
January and February, 2002. Data were
recorded and analyzed in the spring and
summer of 2002. This sample represents
owner/operators that try to proactively
shape collective strategies within the two
associations that face a radically changing
political economy environment and act on
behalf of the entire sectorial membership.
Population and Sampling Issues
The population of interest in this research
was all motorcoach operators in the U.S. as
of September 11, 2001. The sample frame of
interest consisted of all those owner/
operators in attendance at one of two
national conventions: Indianapolis in
January 2002, and Orlando in February
2002.
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Following Campbell (1955), key informants
were asked to fill out questionnaires. Key
informants are identified as owner/operators
of motorcoaches in U.S. markets.
Key
informant bias may exist in the context of
gathering information in the form of
questionnaires (Phillips, 1982), and may
create measurement bias. However, Camp
bell (1955) and Anderson (1985) demonstrate
that key informants provide highly accurate
data when they are knowledgeable and
communicate with the social scientist.
Campbell (1955) suggests that questions be
direct, specific, and in the language of the
informant. An expert in the industry was
engaged in an effort to ensure the data
collection method used here met the criteria
set forth by Campbell. Questions were
designed to achieve clear, specific responses,
confined to issues the respondents likely
knew and were expressed in their terms.
Respondents were assured of anonymity
(Jobber and O’Reilly, 1998) in order to
receive unbiased responses.
Sample Frame
Motorcoach operators were surveyed at two
national conventions. The first convention
was the United Motorcoach Association
(UMA) Convention held in Indianapolis in
January 2002. There were approximately
250 operators in attendance and survey
responses were collected from 100 of the
operators attending the conference.
Additional surveys were collected at the
American Bus Association (ABA)
Convention. This meeting was held in
February 2002 in Orlando. This meeting
brought together a specific group of motor
coach owner/operators that sell tours to meet
with convention bureaus, restaurants, hotels
and destination representatives. At this
meeting, an additional 63 surveys were

collected. Only motorcoach owner/operators
were surveyed.
Some owner/operators
attended both meetings.
If they had
previously completed the survey at the
UMA, they did not complete the survey
again at the ABA. In all, 163 owner/
operators completed the questionnaire.
Respondents were asked to fill out the
survey on site and were encouraged to fill
out the survey in its entirety.
Data Analysis
The data were recorded and analyzed using
SPSS 10.1 software. One hundred sixty
three useable responses were included in the
primary database.
From Table 1 note that all major geo
graphical areas in the U.S. are represented.
Thirty-nine percent of the sample was from
the Midwest, 38% from the Eastern
Seaboard, 14% from the South and 9% from
the West Coast. Approximately 90% of the
sample was involved in family owned
businesses and 38% operated from more
than one location.
In the motorcoach
business, it is common for many owner/
operators to have related businesses that
supplement their motorcoach business. In
the sample, 35% of the owner/operators
responding indicated that they were also
involved in school bus operations.
Nearly one-third of the respondents operated
in 2000 with annual sales between one and
three million dollars, while 11% showed
sales of greater than $5 million. Twentyseven percent of the companies have annual
gross sales of less than $500,000, with 15%
having gross sales of equal to or less than
$250,000. Only 5% of the companies fall
within the $500,001-$750,000 range and

17% of the respondents fall within the
$750,001-$1,000,000 range. The largest
group in the sample, 31%, falls within the
$l,000,000-$3,000,000 range. Eight percent
of the respondents indicated that their gross
sales were in the $3,000,000-$5,000,000
range and 11% of the respondents indicated
that they had gross sales greater than
$5,000,000.
POST 9/11 RESPONSES TO TERROR
IN THE U. S. MOTORCOACH
INDUSTRY
Operational Responses
September 11 has had a profound effect on
the travel industry.
The motorcoach
industry is an important niche in the travel
arena.
Motorcoaches in the U.S. and
Canada carried an estimated 860 million
passengers in 1999.
Sixty-one percent of the owner/operators
responding to the survey indicated that their
customers are now requesting shorter trips
(Table 2). Customers have indicated their
unwillingness to travel to larger cities (Table
3), particularly along the Eastern Seaboard,
and owner/operators have responded with
creative and interesting destinations closer
to their homes. If the days traveled and
distances vary considerably, the operator
will generate less revenue on average.
Increased business will be required to offset
the loss. This is further compounded when
it is noted that 68% of owner operators
indicated that some of their customers had
been ordered not to travel (Table 4). Many
school districts across the country have been
ordered not to travel or, if they do travel on
school sponsored activities, they must avoid
larger cities.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL GROSS SALES
Annual Sales
<$250,000
$250,000- $500,000
$500,001 - $750,000
$750,001 - $1,000,000
$1,000,001 - $3,000,000
$3,000,001 - $5,000,000
> $5,000,000
Missing
TOTALS

Frequency
22
17
7
25
45
12
16
9
163

Percent of Total
13.5
11.8
4.9
17.4
31.3
8.3
11.1
100.0%

TABLE 2
CUSTOMERS REQUESTING SHORTER TRIPS
Requesting shorter
trips?
YES
NO
TOTALS

Frequency

Percent of Total

97
63
160

60.6
39.4
100.0%

TABLE 3
TRIP DEMAND PROXIMITY TO HOME
Requesting trips closer
to home?
YES
NO
TOTALS
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Frequency

Percent of Total

98
62
160

61.3
38.7
100.0%

TABLE 4
CUSTOMERS ORDERED NOT TO TRAVEL
Ordered not to travel?
YES
NO
TOTALS

Frequency
106
50
156

Nearly 60% of owner/operators indicate
their customers are requesting shorter trips.
Similarly, 61% are demanding motorcoach
trips closer to their place of residence. One
hundred and six respondents report that
previous customers have been ordered not to
travel.
A mainstay of the charter industry, casino
charters, has seen some movement as one
quarter of owner/operators report that
casino demand has decreased since 9/11,
and another 15% has seen demand rise
(Table 5).
These results indicate that, under the
diffuse effects of political-institutional
factors, the owner/operators perceive that
radical environmental change will likely
require a higher level of operational
effectiveness within a more localized scope
of operations.
Emergency Preparedness Responses
The data indicate that nearly 47% of
owner/operators have developed a security
plan for their company since 9/11. Thirty
six firms have sent statements to customers
regarding those measures (See Table 6).
Importantly, the line-haul segment would
most likely be interested with particular
security measures. Line-haul is simply
moving passengers from point to point, with
low likelihood the driver gets to know the

Percent of Total
67.5
31.8
99.3%

passenger, as opposed to charter or tour
where the driver spends a significant amount
of time with the same set of passengers on
their excursions.
An analysis of the emergency preparedness
variables indicates a mixed response to terror
by owner/operators in the sample.
For
instance, one would expect greater attention
to security measures for equipment, drivers,
and passengers. Indeed, results indicate that
some of these measures are being taken.
Forty six percent of respondents have issued
identification tags for drivers. Additionally,
nearly 81% of respondents indicate that they
are vigilantly keeping equipment and
baggage service areas locked while not in
use. Seventy percent of respondents noted
they had installed phones in the coaches, and
an additional 49% installed two-way radios.
Communication tools allow tours to operate
smoothly and allows for coordination.
However, some results appear to be counter
intuitive. Only 17 % of respondents indicate
they issue security labels for all baggage.
Less than 9% have installed plexi-glass
designed to protect the driver of the coach.
And only 8% have plans to install cameras
aboard their coaches.
Interestingly, only 20 firms responded that
they are checking all baggage before loading
and merely 43 have increased security
equipment in their garage.
Spring 2003
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TABLE 5
CASINO BUSINESS
Casino demand since
9/11
Increased
Decreased
No Change
TOTALS

Frequency

Percent of Total

25
40
95
160

15.6
25
59.4
100%

TABLE 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Emergency Preparedness Items
Developed a Security Plan
Notified customers of security plans
Issued ID tags for drivers
Issue security labels for all baggage
Baggage and service areas kept locked
Installed plexi-glass to shield driver compartment
Installed phones in motorcoach
Installed cameras in motorcoach
Installed 2-way radios in motorcoach
Increased driver training on handling aggressive passengers
Increased driver training on awareness of surroundings and safety
Increased security equipment for garage
Checking baggage before loading
Security issues are a major concern

The nature of line-haul and charter or tour
business may explain the disparity in the
data. Security issues and measures appear
to be far different to line-haul operators
because of the unknown passenger
construct. That is, it seems logical an
unknown passenger, or unfamiliar one,
would pose more of a threat from the driver’s
perspective, than a known one, or one whom
the driver is able to establish a level of
56
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Yes
73
36
73
27
128
14
108
12
76
66
111
43
20
49

No
84
121
84
131
31
143
46
144
80
91
46
113
137
108

rapport with during an extended excursion.
The level of risk varies across groups of
passengers. For example, groups of students
and teachers or groups of senior citizen
passengers pose far less of a concern than
autonomous, non-group passengers.
Evidently, owner/operators have different
mental models of policy demands in the post
9/11 political economy. In other words, due

to the radical and systemic scope of
environmental change, there is a lot of
ambiguity in this industry sector of how the
regulatory and competitive compo-nents of
the anticipated institutional change will
eventually interact. These results indicate
the need for trade associations to build
collective represen-tation of the anticipated
institutional change in order to build a
collective capacity to influence public
policies.
Recently, the Over-the-Road Bus Security
and Safety Act of 2001 (H.R. 3429) and a
companion bill in the Senate, S. 1739,
generated much discussion in the bus
industry.
This bill was the first ever
designed to provide aid to the private bus
industry. It seeks to establish a $200
million competitive grant program
administered by the Secretary of
Transportation to upgrade security for
buses, drivers, and facilities. The two major
associations representing the motorcoach
industry were at odds over this bill. The
ABA was instrumental in the creation of the
bill. However, the UMA was opposed to the
financing source (Kane, 2002). The bill
requires all commercial bus operators to pay
25 cents per passenger to fund the program.
Secretary of Transportation Norman Y.
Mineta could begin making grants after a
year of collection.
In April 2002, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
approved legislation that would provide $400
million in security grants to private
motorcoach operators.
Under this bill,
operators could apply for grants to help
protect their drivers, implement passenger
screening programs, construct or modify
existing terminals, train employees in threat

assessment, hire security officers, and
install video surveillance and communi
cations equipment (ABA, 2002). The House
bill seeks $600 million.
Strategic Responses
Several items captured strategic imperatives
or initiatives in the survey.
Strategic
responses refer to long-term planning and
intent vis-a-vis acquisitions, restructuring,
and future markets in which to compete.
Only 10 percent of our respondents were
considering selling their business as a result
of the events on September 11th (Table 7).
Twenty-two firms, in fact, are considering
expansion via buying out competitors. Only
two firms were actively seeking a
consolidator (e.g., one of the major three
consolidators) to purchase their operations
and assets, while nine firms indicate
willingness to merge with another firm.
Greater than one-third, however, indicate
their intention to restructure their
operations as a result of the terrorist acts.
Additionally, 54% have seen their tour
business change, 60% have seen charter
business change and nearly one-fourth have
seen their bus operations change. This
change in traditional operations necessitates
a strategic response.
These results indicate that the owner/
operator responses vary on the tacticsstrategy continuum. Evidently, they perceive
differentially how the relationship between
institutional processes (i.e., cognitive beliefs
about the power dynamics in the sector) and
direct state actions (i.e., regulatory or
coercive mechanisms) will eventually impact
the competitive structure of their sector.
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TABLE 7
STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Strategic Issue
Considering selling business
Considering purchasing competitor
Seeking consolidator to buy out
Considering restructuring
Changing school bus operations
Changing tour operations
Changing charter operations
Considering strategic merger

Affirmative
16
22
2
54
36
86
96
9

Negative
144
138
156
100
114
73
63
150

Perceived Overall Impact on the
Motorcoach Industry

losses for fourth quarter 2001 between
$5000 and $100,000.

General perceptions of the impact of episodic
events of terror and resultant strategies and
policies on homeland security were also
captured in the data. One hundred and
eleven respondents indicated their belief
that the terror acts have impacted the
overall industry negatively (Table 8).

The central argument here is that during
the short time period of the post 9/11
transformation of the political economy faced
by this sector, the influences of institutional
change vary in their impacts on
owner/operators’ cognitive model reflecting
their future competitive posture.

Many respondents (60%) indicate that many
of their competitors have gone out of
business (Table 9). Furthermore, competi
tive proximity seems to be expanding in
response to the uncertainty and shakeup in
the industry since September 11th, as 102
respondents specify their geographic market
expanding as a result of the changes since
September 11th. Ninety three respondents
indicate their belief that the industry will
improve by these changes.

FURTHER INTERPRETATION
AND DISCUSSION

In the three months following the terrorist
attacks, most motorcoach carriers lost
business (Table 10). While 13 respondents
reported business revenue actually jumped
in the three months following the attacks,
most reported losses. Nearly 65% reported
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Interpreting these descriptive statistics
leads to insight into an industry’s response
to terror, both in the short-term shore-up
type activities and in long-term, strategic
quests.
The research results indicate that, while
many customers have been ordered not to
travel, those that are traveling are
demanding shorter trips and trips that are
closer to home. It would appear that these
clients are not intimidated by the terrorism,
yet are cautious, staying closer to home in
case the need arises to return quickly.

TABLE 8
INDUSTRY HAS BEEN NEGATIVELY AFFECTED
Overall [-] Affect?

NO
40

YES
111

TABLE 9
COMPETITIVE RESPONSE
Competitive Items
Competitors have gone out of business
Competitors expanding proximity
Business will improve from changes in
industry

Affirmative
94
102

93

Negative
64
54
60

TABLE 10
LOST BUSINESS IN 4th QUARTER, 2001
$ Revenue lost
<$5000
$5001 - $20000
$20001 - $50000
$50001 - $100000
$100001 - $200000
>$200000
Business increased

Frequency
17
30
35
31
6
16
13

Similarly, demand for casino business seems
to indicate that passengers are not canceling
scheduled trips, rather reallocating their
desired destinations.
Emergency preparedness has recently
received attention in the public administra
tion literature. Nearly half of the owner
operators in the survey indicate that new

Percent
11.5
20.3
23.6
20.9
4.1
10.8
8.8

Cumulative %
11.5
31.8
55.4
76.4
80.4
91.2
100.0

security plans had been developed in the
wake of the September 11th terror attacks
and their aftermath. This indicates a pro
active approach to emergency preparation,
rather than reactive strategies.
Interestingly, a small fraction (22.9%) of the
respondents actually communicate that
strategy and emergency preparedness to
customers. This represents an incredible
Spring 2003
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marketing opportunity, as relaying these
efforts may decrease customer’s dissonance
and increase confidence in ridership.
Another opportunity for owner/operators to
relieve fear of travel would be to implement
tagging procedures, an activity only 17 % of
the sample has adopted. Further, the half of
the sample that has not yet issued identi
fication tags for their drivers may be wise to
do so.
It appears other actions toward emergency
preparedness (e.g., installation of plexi
glass, installation of phones, two-way radios,
cameras and other communications equip
ment) is a step in the right direction toward
safety and emergency preparation. Driver
training (for greater awareness of pas
sengers and surroundings) is another step in
emergency preparation hailed by this
industry. Though the handling of aggressive
passengers is nondescript, it appears that
greater training and preparation would be in
order.
Strategic responses were also captured in
the research. Only 16 firms reported their
intent to sell given the aftermath of
terrorism on the industry. More likely to be
seen is not a restructuring of the industry on
a macro level, but rather strategic
restructuring of individual firms within the
industry. Of the three major segments (e.g.,
charter, tour, and school), the greatest
impact was seen in charter operations. This
indicates that strategic initiatives in the
industry in the short-term to mid-term will
likely involve segmentation initiatives.
By a 3-to-2 margin, respondents reported that
direct competitors have gone out of business
as a result of 9/11. It seems far more likely
that a motor carrier will see competitive
pressure from motorcoach carriers from
further and further away from its base
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operation than to see those carriers go out of
business.
Nevertheless, carriers must
concentrate on shoring up their own business
by offering closer-to-home and more frequent
excursions.
While a vast majority of the sample
respondents reported lost revenue (only 13 of
163 reported increased revenues), the lasting
effect is uncertain. Is this lost revenue
canceled business or merely postponed
business?
It could prove insightful to
determine the answer. Clearly, the business
that was education related was canceled
entirely, as service-oriented business is
time-dependent. In other words, if that
business was scheduled for a particular date,
then canceled, it is a lost opportunity and is
non-recoverable (academic years and athletic
seasons conclude). Knowing the answer may
also determine a true recovery from pent-up
demand recoverable only in the very short
term.
In summary, the requirements of homeland
security imply changes not only in the
political economy/ institutional environment
but also in numerous aspects affecting the
functioning of the owner/operator segment of
the motorcoach industry. As these changes
are profound and systemic in nature, they
demand new policy and operational and
strategic responses by owner/operators and
their trade associations. Specifically,
although the changes in the regulatory en
vironment are revolutionary and those in the
com-petitive environment are evolutionary,
the effects of the former lag behind those of
the latter (see Figure 1).
Therefore,
owner/operators in the motorcoach industry
need to make individualized, yet concerted
dynamic and credible commitments to
policies and strategies in the new
“punctuated” institutional environment that
they face. The dynamics and the extent of
these commitments will vary across owner/

operator firms in terms of the trade-offs that
they individually make within their
functional and cognitive models of the sector
and its environ-mental change.

at two locations, but a second wave of ques
tionnaires was not viable. Thus, comparing
latter respondents to early respondents was
infeasible.

LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Another limitation is that only those owner
operators attending one of two major
conferences were included in t he sample
frame. Perhaps those owner/operators not
attending could offer very different insights
into strategic and competitive responses to
terrorism.

While insights were obtained into an indus
try’s response to terrorism, the research is
by no means definitive. While data analysis
was initially limited to dichotomous righthand-side variables, this was a conscious set
of tradeoffs due to the delicate nature of the
topic, lack of public data available from the
unit of interest, and the salient role the
industry’s association (i.e., the UMA) played
in articulating a collective response to the
new environment. Further, previous
research (Arimond and ElFessi 2001)
determined that very few market surveys
are used in tourism-related studies as
Likert-type scales are perceived as too
tedious and demanding for the respondent
and are less likely to capture the
respondents’ intent than a smaller dichoto
mous quantitative scale (Mazenac 1984,
Cheung 1994).
Importantly, the UMA and ABA provided
access to the population sample frame of
interest. Collectively, these associations
wanted to capture responses and intentions,
and were not interested in their members
perceptions (e.g., psychometric captured by
a likert scaled instrument), but rather in
firm behavior. In sum, the associations
wanted to capture collective action.
While the sample captured 163 robust
responses, as in all survey research
(Anderson, 1985) it is possible that those
responding are quite different from non
respondents. The data are further limited in
that it was collected from different members

Several future research streams seem viable
and ought to be pursued. First, this re
search sought answers from a single sector
of transportation and cannot be confidently
generalized across all sectors of trans
portation. However, seeing if other sectors
responded similarly may offer insight into
how service providers respond strategically
to such situations.
Future research should seek to discover
whether there exist any significant clusters
in the data. Cluster analysis might identify
segments with varying tactics and strategies
in response to terrorism. If these clusters
can be identified, then a normative model
might then be produced.
Moreover, combining clustering analysis
with other methodological techniques as
suggested by Kechen and Shook (1995)
might reveal valuable insight. One signifi
cant step is to analyze the clusters in an
attempt to determine specific similarities
and differences among companies in their
post-9/11 responses.
Further theories should be examined to
determine whether an industry left to fend for
itself without governmental intervention can
absorb the cost and respond with collective
action regarding homeland security.
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CONCLUSION
This research makes a significant contri
bution to the emerging arena of homeland
security and the impact of change of this
type on the firms operating and competing in
the U.S. motorcoach industry. Unlike emer
gency preparedness, which is a firm’s
proactive approach to the threat of episodic
terror events and often mandated through
regulatory intervention, homeland security
is a systemic construct and transpires when
the rules of the game change.
Environmental change was modeled in a
transportation and tourism sector based on
the political economy framework. This
framework seems to support well the design
of this empirical study intended to capture

the collective response to the changing
environment of the motorcoach industry
post-9/11. Several descriptive statistics were
analyzed and explained. Future directions
for greater understanding were then offered.
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